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Abstract Pervasive, easy-to-use privacy services are keys to enabling users to
maintain control of their private data in the online environment. This paper proposes
(1) an online privacy lifecycle from the user perspective that drives and categorizes
the development of these services, (2) a layered platform design solution for online
privacy, (3) the evolution of the PeCAN (Personal Context Agent Networking)
architecture to a platform for pervasively providing multiple contexts for user
privacy preferences and online informational privacy services, and (4) use of
platform network effects for increasing wide-scale user adoption of privacy services.
One implication of this paper’s concepts is that platform-mediated networks, which
are reportedly the vehicles for most of the revenue earned by 60 of the world’s
largest companies, and other platforms that commonly host millions of users, will
not have to individually reinvent and manage sophisticated user services for privacy
protection since universal privacy platforms can be layered on them in future.
Keywords Onlineprivacyplatform . P3P. PeCANplatform . Social networking . User
adoption of technologies .Web privacy services . Identity protection
Introduction
Privacy advocates are working with modern and innovative environments in which
operations take place that are beyond the citizen’s control, and/or do not yet fall
within the realms of governance. One such environment is the global Internet, where
experimentation with business models is rampant, the combinations of multi-cultural
approaches and infrastructure readiness is uneven on a per-country basis, and users
are mass-adopting new and disruptive technologies in the shortest cycle times ever
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witnessed in world history. To add to this dynamic picture of progress are
uncertain economics, as at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century,
major and minor economies are in recession, or declaring the end of it with
predictions of sluggish growth for coming years. However, interestingly, even in
these times, firms on the Internet, particularly social networking platforms, have
experienced huge user growth. Countries, rich and poor, have significant
percentages of young people online.
In October 2009, the social networking platform Facebook™ had over 300
million active users, and one million developers and entrepreneurs from over 180
countries (Facebook Statistics 2009). Its fastest growing demographic segment was
approximately 35+ years old, whereas in September 2008, Facebook claimed 200
million active users and its fastest growing demographic was the 25+ age group.
In 2010, Facebook supports over 400 million active users. Moreover, seventy
percent of Facebook users are outside of the US. Clearly, users greatly value the
functionalities offered by such vehicles of worldwide, culture-crossing social
innovation. Online social networks (OSNs) are now in a position to create and
sustain new and old social norms for generations of users. The balance between
personal branding and privacy is being tested and socialized.
In the OSN environment, one question that arises is whether users care about
privacy and its long-held status as a social norm. OSNs’ experiences with user
outrage and legal action over previous launches of privacy-invasive services indicate
that the answer is affirmative. One such experience was recorded when Facebook
launched its News Feed service from the Facebook Home Page in September 2006.
Initially the service was opt-out and it automatically displayed all rich social
information regarding recent activities of friends to other friends. Hostile user
reaction emerged to having user information and interactions monitored and pushed
to friends. Users formed groups, such as Students against Facebook, to speak out
about the service’s privacy problem. Facebook immediately responded to its users’
outcry, and added privacy controls to allow users to decide what information they
would allow to be pushed to others. Facebook’s CEO also publicly apologized for
his company’s mistakes concerning privacy in the OSN.
Surprisingly, given recent company experience with user privacy, but not so
surprising from a profit or business experiment perspective, one year later Facebook
launched a privacy-infringing service called Beacon. Coupled with Facebook Ads,
the Beacon service widened the scope to communicating user data from external
parties, namely ad sponsors (i.e. companies) to the user’s friends. In effect,
information regarding products that a user purchased, or commented on, from a
partnering company’s site would be pushed to the user’s Facebook friends without
explicit user permission. Additionally, many users were not informed about the
program beforehand. This privacy violation was larger than the last and users
escalated their outrage to a class action suit that was settled in Sept 2009, the same
month that Facebook reported being cash flow positive for the first time. As part of
the legal settlement, Facebook agreed to shut off its Beacon service and pay USD
9.5 Million to fund a privacy and online safety foundation. Again, the CEO of
Facebook publicly apologized, the issue subsided, and the OSN continued to grow
rapidly. By now the 6-year old OSN was exhibiting a strategy of launching for profit
services that shared users’ data with many parties, and when or if users objected
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about the company’s handling of their private data, the company reacted by making
amends and seeking forgiveness from its users.
Meanwhile in 2008, on the international scene, the Canadian Privacy Commis-
sioner, Jennifer Stoddard launched a yearlong investigation on Facebook’s privacy
practices, after a number of Ottawa University Law students and the Canadian
Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic filed a complaint about Facebook privacy
practices and potential violations. Her investigation’s 2009 conclusions cited that
Facebook needed to improve its privacy practices by improving its explanations
around user privacy, restricting unnecessary access of user information to application
developers, and not retaining user personal information after her/his account is
deleted. Again, Facebook cooperated with the Privacy Commissioner’s Office to
address its concerns. However, in 2010, the Commissioner started a further
investigation into Facebook’s new privacy policies, after a Canadian user filed a
complaint alleging that Facebook’s December 2009 default settings made his
information more available to others.
Understandably, unsuspecting users do not immediately think of privacy issues
when they join an OSN to network with friends and acquaintances. However
when users notice infringement on their personal space, privacy is clearly
important to them. Also apparent is the tension between user privacy and the
OSNs business model. Again using Facebook as a good example, we see the
bold 2008 launch of Facebook Connect. This time Facebook could give rich user
data, including but not limited to profile information, social graph information
such as Facebook IDs of all friends and spouse, number of wall posts and notes,
photographs, tags etc., to companies that participated in Facebook Connect. One
key difference in this service’s launch was that Facebook gave privacy settings to
allow users to control what information, if any, is provided to the companies.
Due to such organizational learning, Facebook is currently a leader in the OSN
space not only for its functional value but also for the privacy controls provided
to users.
As of March 2010, 80,000 web sites were participants and formed a chargeable
customer group within Facebook Connect. In turn, Facebook users enjoyed the easy
functionality of single sign-on using their Facebook authentication credentials to log
into other web sites, the transfer of their own and friends’ information from the sites
back to Facebook, and the easy viewing of their friends’ related information from
their interactions with the external company sites. With Facebook Connect, the OSN
is moving to a single portal from which users will conduct everyday tasks such as
bank, register for courses, pay bills, and buy goods.
Given the rich personal data exchange, a current issue that worries privacy
advocates is whether users are actively setting their privacy preferences on OSNs.
Ethical business practices would guide OSNs into caring about user education in the
privacy space. Due to the aggressive user growth rate, the importance of branding
and reputation, and previous brushes with users’ outrage over their privacy
infringement, platform sponsors and providers of OSNs should be receptive to their
users, privacy associations, privacy commissioners, and governments’ advocacy, and
be willing to pay close attention to their users’ needs around handling of their private
data. Moreover, on the flipside, these social networking platforms present an
inexpensive and effective opportunity for national privacy advocates to reach out to
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hundreds of millions of their citizens to increase user’s awareness and education
around privacy. Such user education, at a minimum, influences how users share,
protect, and hence control their private information, and informs users how to avert
or detect poor handling of private data, and to avert and/or resolve private data
handling disputes in future.
This paper presents a novel proposal to suggest that privacy platforms for
awareness and education, and aggregation of privacy technologies for users to
protect their privacy, detect privacy violations, and resolve privacy disputes are
the way to go in the future. This proposal is a large step forward in comparison
to the loose bunch of point technologies that are available now. For privacy
platforms to be workable, they need to be sandwiched between other platforms
such as operating systems, mobile devices, and social networking platforms. In
effect, this paper’s proposal and design that layers privacy platforms onto
operating system and social networking platforms may realize the opportunity
to mature the services for the user privacy lifecycle universally across platforms
and hence help billions of citizens to become more privacy-aware and in
control.
The user’s online privacy life cycle
In the last decade, several organizations and researchers attempted to classify privacy
technologies. Best known are the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development’s (OECD 2002) and Olivier’s (2003) single-level classification
systems. The OECD classification supports four categories: personal privacy
enhancing, web-based, information brokers, and network-based as shown in Table 1.
Unfortunately, some of the OECD categories greatly overlap. For instance, personal
privacy enhancing technologies and information brokers are web based. A better
classification is Olivier’s (2003) as shown in Table 2. The computer science
researcher presents five categories according to the purpose of stakeholder usage:
private communication, anonymity, personal control, organizational safeguards, and
inference control.
This paper proposes a higher-level classification system, according to user
behaviour within a privacy lifecycle. This lifecycle system is multiple-level (Jutla et
al. 2010) where each phase of the lifecycle presents itself for further sub-
classification. However, due to space limitations, this paper describes only the top-
level of the privacy lifecycle classification.
Table 1 OECD classification of privacy technologies
Privacy technology category Examples
Personal Privacy Enhancing Cookie managers or blockers, ad blockers, encryption software




My proposal classifies privacy technologies according to user behavioural
phases, that is, when the user
(1) Becomes Aware of privacy issues and rights,
(2) Acts to protect her/his privacy; note that Olivier’s classification is a possible
sub-classification for the Act phase of this Privacy Life Cycle Classification
system.
(3) Detects privacy violations or potential privacy violations, and
(4) Resolves privacy conflicts.
(5) The lengths of time a user spends in each phase differs and the phases are
cyclical, meaning that the user will re-enter them over time. These phases are
illustrated in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1 Four phases of the user’s online privacy life cycle
Table 2 Olivier’s (2003) classification of privacy technologies
Privacy technology category Examples
Private communication Cookie managers or blockers, encryption software
Anonymity Anonymizers, Infomediaries
Personal Control Ad blockers, P3P, Infomediaries, Proxies
Organizational safeguards E-P3P, EPAL, Hippocratic Databases
Inference control Privacy-preserving data mining
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The design of layered privacy platforms for the mass increase of citizen’s privacy-
awareness is motivated by a platform layering strategy I observed as a best practice in
value creation, via coupling platforms, from leading firms such as Salesforce and
Google. In 2007, Google and Salesforce announced a partnership to connect their
respective platforms so that Google’s advertiser customers would be able to know on
which web properties their advertisements were converting to leads and sales.
Conversely, Salesforce’s customers could directly facilitate moving the customer to the
order phase, gain the added benefits of knowing what ads were engaging customers,
and hence better manage ad campaign, lead, and order information. From a theoretical
point of view, this coupling of Google and Salesforce platforms essentially connected
the engage phase to the order phase of the customer life cycle (Craig and Jutla 2001).
In terms of user control of her/his privacy, I identify the development and connection
of the phases within a privacy life cycle shown in Fig. 1. Each phase can correspond to
an individual privacy platform or integrate into one or more privacy platforms. Each
phase can correspond to a category classification as per Table 3.
A privacy life cycle from the user perspective, to the best of my knowledge, has
not been proposed before. In the literature, one finds privacy life cycles from the
organizational perspective (Mont 2006; Guarda and Zannone 2009; Anton et al.
2004). These privacy life cycles for organizations focus on creating, maintaining,
implementing and disposing of privacy policies, and monitoring employee and
systems compliance to them. In common to both the user and organizational privacy
life cycles are the information-providing and information-based services and the
requirement to model personal data and support appropriate representations of user
preferences. I further propose that the same phases of the privacy lifecycle provided
from the user perspective can be used to classify the activities of the privacy life
cycle from the organizational perspective. Details of the privacy life cycle from the
organizational perspective are given in Jutla et al. 2010.
PrimeLife (2008) is a large European Initiative intending to create privacy
technologies for the online arena. Areas of application include electronic commerce
and social networks. Camenisch (2008), PrimeLife technical leader at IBM’s Zurich
Research Lab, states “We aim to develop a toolbox, which you could describe as an
Table 3 Life cycle-based classification of privacy technologies
Categories = phases of
the privacy life cycle
Technology examples
Aware P3P, PeCAN, web site resources
Act Refrain from releasing selected private data (P3P, PeCAN), cookie
managers, blockers, anonymizers, pseudonymizers, encryption
software, firewalls, proxies, privacy-preserving data mining
Detect Online access to personal data, De-anonymizing (linking) software







integrated electronic ‘data manager.’ The data manager provides users with an
overview of which personal data he or she uses when, where, and how. It lets users
define default privacy settings and preferences for all kinds of applications, and it
prompts the user if applications request data for any other purposes.” Allowing users to
define privacy settings and preferences for all kinds of applications implies that context
mechanisms, similar to the concepts introduced in Bodorik and Jutla 2003, Jutla and
Zhang (2005), Jutla and Bodorik (2005), and Jutla et al. (2006) for electronic commerce,
will be supported. PrimeLife is a well-funded European project and its deliverables
are expected to revolutionize available privacy technologies in the marketplace.
The PrimeLife initiative, as per a recent update on its application to social
software (Kuczerawy et al. 2008), has not yet identified a platform solution for
privacy as proposed in this paper. Rather Pekárek and Pötzsch (2009) examine
privacy in social networks and provide use cases to specify privacy requirements for
social network users. In Pekárek and Leenes’s (2009) interesting position paper,
researchers miss the fact that users can greatly influence the policies and practices of
a social networking site. Further, the researchers have not identified that the strength
of the business model of social networking sites depends on strong cross-side
network effects wherein citizens comprise one side. User outrage will necessarily be
avoided by the executive owners of these sites, and social networks will visibly try
to accommodate user privacy needs once the users become aware and voice them.
Motivation for services proposed in this paper (e.g. in Tables 4 and 5) continues
to appear in the literature. For example, Van Alsenoy et al (forthcoming) discuss
whether privacy regulations should apply among users, and Reay et al. (2009)
demonstrate how web sites are not necessarily visibly complying with jurisdictional
privacy regulations.
The aware phase
PeCAN and P3P share a common privacy model based on an educational focus and
information-providing approaches to enhancing user control over personally
identifiable information. I present the argument that good mechanisms to provide
user control, such as P3P, PeCAN and HCI- related privacy mechanisms, implicitly
have an educational aspect to them. Indeed, electronic privacy research in the
information systems, human-computer interaction, and computer science areas
(Jajodia 1996; Kobsa 2002; Patrick and Kenny 2002), and various implementations
(e.g. AT&T’s Bird, Microsoft’s IE6) encourage organizations to provide explanations
to their customers for why and what purposes data is being collected and with whom
the collected data can be shared. The rationale is that comprehension on the users’
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part will prevent misunderstandings, increase the perception of user control, and
hence increase trust in e-commerce.
P3P is foundational in that it provides a valuable XML vocabulary for privacy on
which many information-providing services can be built. PeCAN expands P3P in
two important ways (1) by allowing users to customize their privacy preferences
according to contexts, and (2) providing sophisticated information-providing
services that intend to help users avoid giving out information that can be used by
others to harm their privacy.
While the Platform for Privacy Preferences (Cranor 2003; Cranor et al. 2002a, b,
2006) is the most mature online platform for making the user aware of what
organizations’ privacy policies state, its development may be complemented by other
privacy platforms that are also information-and service providing. These comple-
mentary platforms may provide further sophisticated services to prevent the user
from releasing private information, according to his/her privacy preferences, to an
organization. This paper evolves the PeCAN (Personal Context Agent Networking)
architecture into a platform and layers it onto the P3P platform, thereby illustrating
how privacy services can develop and evolve in a platform environment. Moreover, a
later section in this paper shows how the platform concept is a key vehicle for
widespread user adoption of privacy web services.
Users’ privacy requirements last a lifetime and beyond. Education is a first-phase
preventative approach to privacy management. This first phase maps to the Aware
phase of the user’s online privacy life cycle illustrated in Fig. 1. Other phases are the
Act, Detect, and Resolve phases. Each of these four phases are explained and
illustrated in “The user’s online privacy life cycle”.
The act phase
User actions that emerge out of an increased privacy-awareness phase involve
preventing privacy violations through limiting and/or avoiding release of private data
to organizations, and questioning and/or negotiating with service providers about
Table 5 Ten complex privacy services
Comparison type Entity Entity Entity
3-way comparisons (1 or more governments, 1
or more organizations, and 1 or more users)
Government Organization User
Multiple Orgs (2 or more )and 1 User Organization Organization User
Multiple Governments (2 or more) and 1 User Government Government User
Multiple Users (2 or more) and 1 Government User User Government
Multiple Orgs (2 or more) and 1 Government Organization Organization Government
Multiple Governments (2 or more)and 1 Org Government Government Organization
Multiple Users (2 or more)and 1 Org User User Organization
Multiple Governments (2 or more) Government Government Government
Multiple Organizations (2 or more) Organization Organization Organization
Multiple Users (2 or more) User User User
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their intentions regarding the management and use of the data before releasing it to
organizations. These actions are win-win to users and business as empirical research
results (Jutla et al. 2004b) show that adoption of user intervention (uIV) tools such
as P3P-based agents, encryption, cookie cutters, pseudonymizers, and anonymizers
increase user trust in e-business.
Using the PeCAN and P3P platforms, users can also actively choose not to reveal
their personal data to requesting organizations and thus these platforms service the
Act phase where users take action to protect their privacy through non-disclosure.
However, non-disclosure is not always possible, and so other popular privacy
technologies and tools have emerged for users to take further explicit action to
protect their privacy. These include the encryption-based approaches found in the
FaceCloak (Luo et al. 2009) and NOYB (Guha et al. 2008) services, the PGP
encryption platform (PGP 2009), and GnuPG tools. Various forms of encryption
have been used to address authentication, access control, data confidentiality, data
integrity, and non-repudiation needs on secure networks for decades (Denning 1982;
Jajodia 1996; You et al. 1998). Many users have sought encryption services when,
for example, they look for the shttp or https prefixes in web URLs, or the lock
symbol on web pages. Users employ encryption approaches at a later phase when
they choose to take pragmatic action to secure their private data after becoming
aware or educated about privacy risks and solutions.
In some popular online social networks, increasing the extent of encryption-based
approaches may have the disadvantage of changing some degree of functionality of
the social networks. The usability of the encryption techniques has been a com-
plicating issue (Whitten and Tygar 1999). However, software developers are aware of
the usability issues and hence encryption implementations are becoming friendlier and
easier to use, as apparent in Google’s Gmail support for SSL encryption.
Further, users can act to protect their privacy by employing anonymization
technologies to prevent websites from collecting their identities by hiding or
blocking identifying information such as cookies and IP addresses (Bayardo
and Srikant 2003; Senicar et al. 2003; Goldberg et al. 1997). Other mature
technical appliances for security and privacy that users actively employ are
proxies and firewalls. Such tools are popularly described in the business literature
(e.g. Panko 2008).
A popular means for a user to take control over maintaining her/his privacy is
through applying the privacy settings available on browsers and some web sites.
Social networking websites, in particular, are trying to address their users’ privacy
needs by providing settings to allow users to restrict certain categories of their
private data from being displayed.
More emergent technologies are the location-based privacy protocols imple-
mented in privacy services for mobile social networks, such as Buddy Beacon,
Loopt, and Whrrl, and which are being prototyped (Zhong et al. 2007) in
research labs. Moreover, attempts at identity theft can be prevented by user
actively using web anti-spoofing tools. Web spoofing, also known as “phishing” or
“carding”, is a form of internet crime for identity theft (Chou et al. 2004). In Chou
et al. (2004), a browser plug-in called SpoofGuard to protect users is described.
The SpoofGuard detects spoofing by analyzing email to find suspicious links, and
alerts the user.
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The phases outlined here and the technologies discussed are from the user
perspective and hence can be under the user control. Users benefit also from the
organizational perspective when organizations similarly act and employ technolo-
gies to protect customer, employee, and partner privacy.
The detect phase
In the Detect phase, users may find out that their data has been mishandled in some
way. For example, their information is aggregated in a manner that makes some
private data visible and accessible to a larger audience than they initially intended.
The violations can range from minor to severe. Users may detect privacy violations
using many means including through simple online access of what data the
organizations are holding and for what purposes the data were used. If these
purposes, for instance, do not match what the user agreed to when her/his data was
collected, then violations can be flagged.
Organizations and governments seek to preserve individuals’ privacy while
releasing information or profiling users to provide optimized services. A common
approach is to de-identify data to be released by removing the identifiers. However,
de-identified information can be recovered from existing information, i.e. the
remaining data fields available about the user. This can lead to a type of inadvertent
privacy violation known as a linkage attack where “attackers use innocuous data in
one data set to identify a record in a second data set with both innocuous and
sensitive data.”(Greengard 2008)
Narayanan and Shmatikov (2009) created a re-identification algorithm that can be
used to detect how private information is available online. Their algorithm re-
identified users in the anonymized social network graphs available in social
networking platforms by connecting the dots among user information provided on
multiple platforms. The researchers showed how a third of the users, who can be
verified to have accounts on Twitter and Flikr, were re-identified in the anonymous
Twitter graph with a 12% error rate. Narayanan and Shmatikov (2009) also developed
a re-identification algorithm that they applied to the Netflix Prize dataset, which contains
anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 subscribers of Netflix, the world’s largest online
movie rental service. Using “the Internet Movie Database as the source of background
knowledge, we successfully identified the Netflix records of known users, uncovering
their apparent political preferences and other potentially sensitive information.”
(Narayanan and Shmatikov 2009) Note that identity-linking is not limited to social
networks but can be done among pseudonyms or identifiers used to login, at the
network-and application levels, on different systems, or email addresses, and so on.
It is possible that identity-linking can be the basis of a future user service as a user
may find it useful to know what can be derived about him/her from the information
posted on the web already. PeCAN also hosts a service for inference control (An et
al. 2009) which prevents the user from releasing further information that would
enable her/his privacy-sensitive contexts from being derived from those already
released to ubiquitous software-enabled environments. In a sense PeCAN’s inference
control service does detection as it must first automatically detect a potential privacy
violation and then alert the user to prevent it. It is a service that spans the Act and
Detect phases.
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Indeed, the services that provide users with reasonable control over their private
information are information-based or information-providing. Similarly, the software
services in firms that enforce the protection of customers and employee privacy are
information-based or information-providing. Note that we can make a further
distinction between information-based versus information-providing models. En-
cryption, anonymization, and anti-spoofing use information-based models in that
they manipulate, perturb, or block information in some way and thus belong to one
class, whereas technologies such as P3P, PeCAN, and re-identification are based on
information-providing models.
The resolve phase
In the Resolve phase, users are provided with several options depending on their
jurisdiction and its privacy governance models. In the US, recourse is through
discussion, and if high-conflict, through user-actioned lawsuits. In countries with
Privacy Commissioners, the user can complain to the Commissioner and any
investigative and legal costs are borne by the government. Indeed, Bennett (1992)
proposes five models that describe the privacy governance models in use by most
countries’ governments, according to who bears primary responsibility for protecting
privacy interests: voluntary control (e.g. US), subject control (e.g. US), data
commissioner model (e.g. Canada), registration (e.g.UK), and licensing (e.g.
Norway). The bearer(s) of the primary responsibility are either or combinations of
data gatherer, data subject, and government. In voluntary control and subject control, the
organizations and citizens self-regulate on privacy issues. The data commissioner model
uses a privacy ombudsman to help protect citizens’ privacy. Whereas the registration
and licensing models mean the data gatherers must first register with the government the
data stores or databases which contain private data. Under the registration model, the
government can deregister a store as a penalty if citizens complain about privacy
infractions. In the licensing model, government employees are tasked to do inspections
for compliance. Thus the privacy governance model also determines how active an
oversight agency is in the Detect phase as well.
Many countries have web portals, blogs, and wikis to provide information leading
to resolutions. The Canadian Federal Privacy Commissioner’s web site has a serial
listing of hundreds of privacy resolutions (Canada Federal Privacy Commissioner
2010). The Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario maintains a web site
that includes indexed lookup of hundreds of summaries and resolutions (Ontario
Information and Privacy Commissioner 2010). The online services for the Resolve
phase are information-providing vs. transactional at this point.
Layering privacy platforms
Potentially there can be a privacy platform for each phase of the privacy life cycle, or
one privacy platform can be created to host technologies to address all phases. It is
more likely, in the beginning, with the fragmented efforts of privacy advocates,
researchers, developers, and policymakers all around the world, that several
platforms will emerge, and that the technologies to support the different user phases
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will map to these platforms. Indeed, this fragmentation of privacy platforms is the
phenomenon we are witnessing today.
The platform concept is central to the development of this paper. A key concept is
that online privacy services, which give the user some control over their private
data, may be bundled in one or more privacy platforms and these privacy platforms
may piggyback on social networking and other platform-mediated networks for
widespread user adoption of privacy protection services. The layered design
illustrates this concept in Fig. 2.
A useful platform (e.g. Windows, Akamai) provides a subset of services and rules
employed by users in most of their transactions. Further, successful platforms are
characterized by their usability, convenience, and pervasiveness. Business research-
ers define the platform-mediated network (hereafter referred to as a platform) as
providing “a subset of components and rules employed by users in most of their
transactions.” (Eisenmann et al. 2006) Examples of components are hardware,
software, and services. Rules are the technical standards, protocols for information
exchange, policies, and contracts that govern transactions (Baldwin and Clark 2000).
There are one-sided and many-sided platforms. In a one-sided platform, users are
all part of a homogeneous user base whereas a many-sided platform supports
different and non-overlapping groups or networks of users or customers. For
example, in 2-sided networks (Rochet and Tirole 2003; Parker and Van Alstyne
2005), users are permanent members of one distinct group, a “side,” which transacts
with a second side. Examples of popular many-sided e-business platforms are
Pervasive Platforms on Users ‘ Client Devices
Operating Systems Platforms  e.g. Mac OS, UNIX, Windows, their mobile variants, Android, CE
Many Common Services to Applications 
AWARE -EDUCATE – e.g. Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) and PeCANPlatform
ACT – P3P/PeCAN(user chooses not to provide PII), 
Encryption services (e.g. FaceCloak, NOYB), PGP Encryption Platform) , 
Anonymizingservices (less applicable to platform-mediated networks), 
Pseudonymizingservices
Pervasive Platforms
Organizations’ Platforms – e.g. Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Flikr, Google, Monster, MySpace, Ning, 
Orkut, SalesForce, Skype, Twitter, VISA, Xbox, YouTube  
RESOLVE (informational not yet transactional)
Information-providing through web sites e.g. 
http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Decisions-and-Resolutions/Decisions-and-Resolutions-Summary/?id=8303
DETECT  - e.g Narayaran and Shmitov – Linking SN Information that re-identifies
Fig. 2 Layering privacy platforms and operating systems and platform-mediated networks
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Alibaba, Amazon, Baidu, eBay, Clipvn, SalesForce.com, Visa, Monster, Xbox, and
YouTube while examples of many-sided online social networking platforms are
Facebook, Flikr, Orkut, QQ,Ning, MySpace, and Twitter.
A platform’s value to a user depends on the number of other network users, and is
subject to network effects (Katz and Shapiro 1985; Economides 1996). Network
effects represent users’ willingness to participate in, as expressed as their
willingness-to-pay to associate with a platform, in the presence of an increasing or
decreasing number of participants in the networks mediated by the platform. Social
networking sites enjoy strong same side and cross-side network effects. When many
friends of a user join Facebook on the same-side, for example, the more valuable the
platform becomes to the user as he/she can communicate conveniently with a larger
number friends through a common medium. The more users that join Facebook, the
more application developers (a second Facebook customer group), and advertisers (a
third Facebook customer group) will join on the cross-side. Users value the variety
offered by the larger application development group and hence the platform becomes
more valuable to the users. The latter phenomenon is a cross-side effect in the
direction of application group to the user. Details of the high-level layered platform
design will be elaborated in “Layering platforms—P3P, PeCAN, operating systems,
social networks, and others”.
Layering platforms—P3P, PeCAN, operating systems, social networks,
and others
This section provides an illustration of the design presented in “Layering privacy
platforms”. It details the layering and synergies of two privacy platforms for the
Aware phase of the Privacy Life Cycle. The privacy platform design is then
illustrated where the combined services of the two privacy platforms are sandwiched
in between the operating systems on user devices, such as the iPhone, and social
networks or other high-level platforms.
Platform for privacy preferences—P3P (1997–2007)
Developed from 1997–2007 by a relatively small group of experts from US and
European universities and industry, the best-known online privacy platform is the
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P). It enables organizations to represent their
online privacy policies in a standard privacy-labeled format. Users’ privacy software
agents can then retrieve these specially formatted policies and automatically
understand them. The syntax of P3P consists of a data schema and multiple privacy
policy statements. The data schema part defines data elements that can be used in
privacy policy statements. Each policy statement specifies what data will be
collected, with whom they will be shared, for how long they will be retained and for
what purposes. In order for the agents from the users’ side to pre-fetch, interpret, and
check these policies automatically, privacy policy statements are encoded in a
machine-readable XML format on organizations’ websites. The policy specification
language has been a W3C Recommendation as P3P Version 1.0 since April 2002
(Cranor et al. 2002b), and P3P Version 1.1 is a Working group note as of 2007.
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AT&T provides a free P3P agent called Privacy Bird as a user add-on to the IE6
browsers. Bird checks for P3P policies for all content on a page visited by the user,
compares them to the users’ privacy preferences, and reports on the match using a
traffic-light metaphor (green, yellow, red), and a synopsis of alerts such a pop-up
with text “this site can sell any medical data collected to third parties.” In 2003, 30
percent of the top 100 Web sites were P3P enabled (Byers et al. 2003). In addition, a
number of easy-to-use tools are available for Web-masters to post privacy policies in
P3P format. Microsoft Internet Explorer 6 (IE6) and Netscape Navigator 7 Web
browser provide basic P3P functionality. A 2002 study of mainly over 50-year old users
reports that the Privacy Bird is a useful agent. These user privacy agents simplify the
task of examining the privacy policies posted by the websites and determining whether
they are acceptable to the users/clients—a task that is cumbersome and disliked by
users according to Lorrie Cranor, a leading privacy researcher and P3P author.
The P3P 1.1 specification provides a full description of the industry-wide XML-
based data schema for privacy as well as the P3P protocol. Their full descriptions can
be found at w3c.org/p3p. Unfortunately, further work was suspended on the newest
version of P3P (v 1.1.) in 2007, due to low browser uptake and industry response. As
P3P provides the most useful privacy markup language for the web, progress for web
privacy services and privacy-enabled semantic web services will be made if work
continues on P3P 1.1 to move it to accepted W3C standard in the future, and for other
sophisticated privacy services to be built on top of the P3P platform. An alternative
option would be for P3P to be rebranded and incorporated in another platform. It is this
author’s opinion that low uptake of the use of P3P agents was directly due to:
(1) The lack of online privacy education for users in general, and hence a lack of
user readiness to demand that companies carefully and ethically handle their
private data in future,
(2) A lack of user awareness that such a platform was available, and
(3) The under-funding of research and development and marketing efforts to
maintain and market the platform.
That future is still not here as the average online user is naïve, currently to the
point of ignorance, regarding online privacy issues and how apparently “cool” or
convenient platform services can violate her/his privacy. A more recent study
(Cranor et al. 2008) shows that “P3P had been deployed on 10% of the sites returned
in the top-20 results of typical searches, and on 21% of the sites returned in the top-
20 results of e-commerce”. However, we put ourselves in a good strategic and
technical position to help address deficiencies and avert crises when privacy
technology research is proactive and anticipative rather than reactive.
The PeCAN platform (2002–present)
PeCAN’s platform vision is to provide common privacy services to other online
platforms and e-businesses. PeCAN’s common service provides customized privacy
preferences according to user context (space, time, country, organization, role of
person, role of other interacting persons). In contrast, P3P provides one set of
privacy preferences for all contexts. In addition, PeCAN supports multiple privacy
services. Examples are services to maintain privacy-contexts and user-control
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mechanisms, sixteen enumerated services consisting of comparisons of government
privacy regulations, business privacy policies, and user data handling preferences,
and composite web services to maintain control over Personally Identifiable
Information (PII) according to users’ privacy and socio-economic concerns.
Software and services components of the PeCAN platform
PeCAN provides Web privacy services for managing users’ social, ethical, and
economic preferences for their private data. These services describe how the user can
prevent the spread of their private information to unethical or environmentally
unfriendly businesses, or to organizations that share customer data with a third party
partner originating from a country with human rights abuses or poor privacy laws.
Specifically, PeCAN’s services can help users address the following socio-economic
concerns.
➢A user wants to know whether her/his privacy preferences match the privacy
practices of each of the organization’s third party business partners.
➢A user wants to know whether privacy laws and authorities exist in Canada to
enforce the intentions statedwithin the privacy policies on the businesses’web sites.
➢The user does not want to do business with a company that has CheatersInc or
UnGreenCompany as a third party business partner because he/she considers
these as unethical or environmentally unfriendly.
➢The user does not want to have her/his information shared with a third party
business partner that is in a country with poor privacy laws.
➢The user does not want to deal with a company that shares customer data with
a third party partner originating from a country with human rights abuses.
The PeCAN software agent architecture was presented in Jutla et al. 2006. It
consists of a multi-agent system interacting with entities on behalf of the user. The
platform prototype is developed in Java and C++ and uses mainstream web services
standards, such as XML (Extensible Markup Language), SOAP, UDDI (Universal
Description Discovery and Integration) , WSDL (Web Services Description
Language), and the Web Ontology Language, OWL. Web privacy ontology (Kim
et al. 2002) is a software component of PeCAN. It was motivated and designed in
Jutla and Xu 2004; Jutla et al. 2006.
PeCAN’s services support, among other things, a collaboration between its
personal context agent (Jutla and Zhang 2005) and a P3P agent in order to apply
context-specific privacy rules during a user’s electronic commerce transaction with
an organization’s Web site or Web services. It has a number of other specialized
software agents. A monitor agent (Bodorik and Jutla 2003; Jutla and Bodorik 2005)
oversees the user’s interaction with Web forms and other interaction mechanisms at
Web service sites. A context agent manages dynamic changes of the user privacy
context as the user interacts with sites on the Web, informs the user about the current
privacy-related context for decision support within a Web transaction, and triggers
revision of user privacy preferences either due to other agents in the architecture, or
actions by the user. The arbitrator agent (He and Jutla 2006) allows users to
negotiate on their PII’s usage purposes, handling both recipients and retention
periods of personally identifiable data with an organization on the Web. The
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regulatory agent invokes privacy Web services and utilizes external service feeds and
trusted third party (TTP) agents to obtain knowledge on privacy regulations,
guidelines, and service sites in multiple jurisdictions. Recommendations for
additions to P3P were made in Jutla and Xu (2004), Jutla et al. 2004a and Jutla
and Bodorik (2005).
Other web privacy services can allow the user to find out more information about
the privacy practices of an organization’s business partners. Users are concerned as
many companies share their data with partners and third party service providers. A
user may be interested in examining a partner’s privacy policy or finding out under
which regulations and jurisdictions the partnering organizations fall. PeCAN
supports a proof-of-concept ontological privacy service that can look up various
countries’ privacy regulations.
While the P3P agent compares a user’s privacy preference and a business’ privacy
policy, a PeCAN service can compare a business and a government’s privacy policy.
Another PeCAN service would compare a user’s privacy preferences and
government privacy regulations. The six possible two-way comparison combinations
are enumerated in Table 4.
Web privacy services are useful not only for enabling these six two-way
comparisons among user, government, and business stakeholders, but also for single
stakeholder comparisons. For example, a service to compare business policies can be
useful in several areas. One is the area of multiple jurisdictions where users might
deal with a Web multinational, that is, with a company doing electronic commerce
through subsidiaries in many countries (for example Amazon Japan or Amazon UK).
A Web service doing such a comparison would tap resources, such as the Safe
Harbor initiative, which lists membership information of companies who abide by
other countries’ privacy laws when doing business in those countries. Another area
could be a Web service in which a user can compare many business’ privacy policies
to determine which of them handle personally identifiable data in a manner that is
appropriate to the user.
PeCAN provides a service to perform a three-way comparison among user
preferences, business practices, and government regulations (Jutla and Xu 2004;
Jutla et al. 2004a). This comparison could be useful to an Internet user in several
ways. An automatic comparison between the contents of P3P elements
representing business privacy practices and those representing privacy law may
result in highlighting to the user (1) omissions in the business’ P3P policy
statements, or (2) concerns of mismatch of interpretation of privacy legislation.
The P3P specification is not yet mature enough in terms of element definitions to
handle many legal subtleties cleanly. Hence a Web service can be useful to the
user in flagging absence/presence, or ambiguity, of fair information principles
regarding privacy as defined in law in the business’ practices expressed in P3P
policies.
Table 5 enumerates several other useful services for PeCAN which are proposed
in this paper, based on comparison services between businesses, governments, and
users. That is, in future PeCAN can implement services for a user to compare the
privacy policies of two or more businesses, the privacy regulations for two or more
governments, two or more sets of user privacy preferences, the privacy policies of
multiple businesses against a set of user privacy preferences, and so on.
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A further PeCAN service makes context sharing among software agents privacy-
conscious. Bayesian network-based inference control methods (An et al. 2006, 2009)
prevent privacy-sensitive contexts from being derived from those already released to
ubiquitous software-enabled environments.
To increase the usability of the web privacy services, and to bring privacy
management to mobile voice commerce, in 2005, Keselj and Jutla developed a high-
level conceptual multi-agent software architecture which integrates natural language
capability to be used in Internet Information Retrieval (IIR) tasks and privacy
management. These improved PeCAN services are at experimental stages.
The market sides of the PeCAN platform
The PeCAN architecture specifies software components and services that may run
on standard computer hardware. Service transactions have specific workflow and
user input requirements that are part of the platform rules. Rules for a privacy
platform are also dictated by the jurisdiction(s) of the operating platforms, including
country- and industry-relevant regulations, laws, and acts.
To evolve the PeCAN architecture to a platform, we identify its markets or sides.
One market comprises the users with privacy concerns, including those whose socio-
economic beliefs restrict the association of their privacy data with others, including
organizations. The other market is composed of the organizations and their partners
that wish to offer privacy protection to its users. See Fig. 3 for illustration of the two
markets or sides to the PeCAN platform.
Some platform markets cannot be developed without piggybacking on other
platforms. Such is the case with current privacy platforms. P3P and PeCAN’s
markets are limited without Internet Explorer, Safari, Mozilla Firefox, and Chrome’s
support for their P3P and PeCAN agents and services, and a privacy vocabulary that
is a web standard. Each client device must have an operating system, and hence
privacy platform dependence and layering on operating system platforms is a natural
extension. Similarly, without organizations and application providers placing their
privacy policies in P3P-markup format, existing privacy platforms, P3P and PeCAN,
will not have another market with which to connect their user services.
In Fig. 3, I focused on layering P3P and PeCAN platforms with the social
networking organizations’ platforms as these hosts hundreds of millions of users in
well over 180 countries. This paper thus proposes a strategy for stakeholders to use
the strong network effects of the social networking (SN) platforms to make privacy
services pervasive.
A platform can also be viewed as a technology disruptor. According to Brydon &
Vining (2006), new technologies can disrupt a market by “changing individual
incentives for creating and sharing information, raising or lowering the costs of
enforcing property rights, reducing or relocating transaction costs, and supporting
institutional mechanisms (e.g. rating/reputation systems).” I suggest that social
networking platforms are ideal environments for institutionalizing privacy mecha-
nisms as well. Such institutionalization would lead to pervasive provision and use of
privacy services, and the enhancement of socially innovative platforms that have
“assets which can hardly be copied and which contribute to sustainable
competitiveness.” (Scheinstock et al. 2001; Jutla and Yu 2008)
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Technology research often anticipates a future scenario. In this case it would be a
scenario where users are better educated about online privacy issues. Privacy
training will come from multiple sources, including classes in schools and
specialized courses for employees. It would be an oversight to overlook the social
service that OSN platforms can provide to their users in helping build privacy
awareness and promoting informed and forward-looking user choices.
User-centric combined services for the aware and act phases
Consider a user being logged on to an Online Social Network (OSN) site where she
can not only communicate with friends and co-workers but also invoke widgets that
enable her to bank, invest, pay bills, conduct e-commerce, donate to charity,
volunteer, find an employer, recruit others, and so on. Each additional task supplies
information to the OSN or its linked partners. Some of the information is personally
 
 
Pervasive Platforms on Users ‘ Client Devices
e.g. Operating Systems Platforms  e.g. Android, Linux, Mac OS, UNIX, Windows, Windows CE, 
Many Common Services to Applications 
PLATFORM VISION: Provide Common Privacy Services to Platform-mediated networks and e-businesses
PeCANservices design provide:  privacy-contexts and user-control mechanisms, 16 possible comparison-
based services of Government, Business, and User preferences; composite web services
to maintain control over PII according to Users’ Privacy and Socio-Economic Concerns
PeCANPlatform  (2002-)
Common Service: Provides Customized Privacy Preferences  
according to User Context (space, time, country, organization, role of person, role of other interacting persons); multiple 
PeCANprivacy services
Handful of Technical  Expert Champions -Work on P3P 1.1 is Suspended (2007) –Insufficient Browser 
Uptake or Insufficient Industry Address of User Privacy Concerns 
Current P3P Agent Implementations provide: one set of privacy preferences for all situations; automatic 
comparison of privacy preferences to web sites’ P3P-represented policies; convenient interface metaphors 
such as the traffic-light on AT&T Bird
P3P Platform  (1997 -)
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Side 1: The organizations (i.e. the platforms and their partnering companies (e.g. 
application developers, advertisers etc.)) 
Side 2: The users 
Fig. 3 Platform layers from operating systems on user devices to organizations’ platforms
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identifying. The user is in an uncertain environment where she has privacy, security,
ethical, economic, and social concerns. Various issues that she may be concerned
about may be a subset or a superset of the following:
(1) She wants to know all the intended purposes/uses and possible dissemination of
her information which she has tagged as private at the OSN site.
(2) She wants to do business only with firms that post a privacy policy.
(3) She wants to know that the business’ privacy practices match her privacy
preferences and to be alerted if they do not.
(4) She wants a store that will not only encrypt her credit card information but also
the contents of her shopping basket.
(5) She wants to know whether her privacy preferences match the privacy practices
of each of the OSN supplier’s third party business partners.
(6) She wants to know whether privacy laws and authorities exist in the business’
jurisdiction to enforce the intentions stated within the privacy policies on the
businesses’ web sites.
(7) She does not want to do business with a company that has CheatersInc or
UnGreenCompany as a third party business partner because she considers these
as unethical or environmentally unfriendly.
(8) She does not want to have her information shared with a third party business
partner that is in a country with poor privacy laws.
(9) She does not want to deal with a company that shares customer data with a
third party partner originating from a country with human rights abuses.
(10) She wants to know which private data protection law has precedence for her
transaction.
(11) She would like to negotiate a quick electronic contract with a third party
partner of the OSN, in which the company becomes obligated to destroy her
data if it and its assets are sold to another company.
(12) She wants to know that she does not inadvertently provide information on a
Web form at this site that goes against her stated privacy preferences. For
instance, she has a preference not to give out her age, but she provides her
birth-date and weight in the context of buying prescription medication to a
business linked to the OSN.
(13) When she returns to the OSN, she would like to review her information and
contracts for all the businesses or organizations linked to the OSN.
(14) She wants to review her privacy preferences for a linked site when she returns
to the OSN site.
(15) She wants to maintain online privacy preferences for particular classes of
organizations.
(16) She wants the OSN to keep her data that she provides to its various partners
unlinked.
(17) She wants to ensure that private data that she intends to give out will not cause
her other private data to be derived.
Analyzing these requirements, we see that current P3P agents will support the
first three requirements on this list. Requirement 4 can be satisfied by an extension to
P3P with a <SAFEGUARDS> tag and accompanying extension of the P3P agent’s
matching algorithm to do a SAFEGUARDS comparison. Satisfying requirements 5–9
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are the focus of the cooperating PeCAN Web services in (Jutla et al. 2004a). Data
support in a Web privacy ontology combined with implementation of the PeCAN
services shown in Tables 4 and 5 is envisaged to support requirement 10. Services
to implement negotiation and contracts as in requirement 11 are described in
another paper (He and Jutla 2006). PeCAN’s design includes services to satisfy
requirements 12–17.
State-of-the-art privacy agents, such as the P3P-based agent PrivacyBird (AT&T
2005), are currently limited by fixed-format form interfaces. User preferences are
restricted to specifying user rules for handling of his/her personal data in categories
such as health, financial, and physical data. A good example of such a form is the
Privacy Preference Settings form that AT&T Bird uses (see www.privacybird.com/
tour/1_2_beta/). These settings are done at a large grain level that is user-friendly but
lacks flexibility for personalizing privacy software according to a wide range of
subjective user preferences and weightings of these preferences.
It would be useful for these interfaces to be customizable to include other items
such as:
& Warn me about companies that share customer information with other companies
that do not have privacy statements.
& Warn me about companies that share with other companies whose practices
violate my privacy, ethical, and/or social preferences.
& Warn me about a company that has a third party partner that is on my blocked
list.
& Warn me about businesses, 3rd party, or otherwise, that are in jurisdictions with
no enforcement of fair information practices.
Summary of contributions, managerial, and user implications
This paper introduces a privacy life cycle concept from the user perspective thereby
contributing to the classification theory for online privacy management and
technologies. The privacy life cycle of Aware, Act, Detect, and Resolve asserts at
least the following:
(1) Users’ knowledge of privacy issues and readiness to act on protecting privacy
change over time and hence pass through different phases, each posing
different challenges and opportunities in the changing online environment,
(2) Protecting privacy requires different, yet sometimes overlapping, strategies and
tools in each life cycle stage, and
(3) Protecting a user’s privacy continues indefinitely, so the phases will cycle or
repeat continuously throughout her/his lifetime, and for those affected (e.g.
family members), beyond the lifetime.
The second major contribution of the paper is a design for providing privacy
protection via layering privacy platforms. The multi-layer privacy technology
platforms and their services may map to one or more of the lifecycle phases.
Formal privacy platforms from the user perspective currently exist only for the
Aware and Act phases. Online technologies are becoming available to add to
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platforms for the first three phases while the Resolve phase’s technology assistance
is mainly through information-providing web sites at this time. The paper illustrated
the application of platform management theory (Eisenmann et al. 2006) to privacy
platforms wherein the PeCAN architecture is evolved to a platform to show the
value of layering and combining privacy services across privacy platforms. What
user privacy requirements are addressed through the combined service offerings of
the P3P and PeCAN platforms are identified.
Another key contribution is that the platform concept can be turned into a
bonanza, versus a nightmare for privacy, as piggybacking a privacy platform onto
the strong network effects of existing operating systems and social networking
platforms could translate to wide scale adoption of privacy services for awareness,
action, detection, and resolution. That is, a strategy to make privacy pervasive is for
user privacy services to become widely available, predictably and consistently,
across mainstream platforms. This paper proposed accomplishing the wide scale
pervasiveness of privacy services through a design to layer privacy platforms onto
existing popular platforms.
With a platform-based strategy, the popularity of social networks, and a growing
suite of online privacy services to meet the needs of the phases of the privacy life
cycle, in coming years billions of users will have access to and will adopt the tools to
take control and maintain their privacy online.
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